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The Effect of Corruption Distance and Market Orientation on the Ownership 
Choice of MNEs: Evidence from China 
 
 
 
1.Introduction  
 
The appropriate ownership of productive enterprise is a central issue in economic theory 
and a practical question for multinational enterprises (MNEs) establishing new foreign 
affiliates. With the unprecedented acceleration of worldwide foreign direct investment 
(FDI), the question has become the object of considerable study (Johnson and Paul, 1975; 
Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Dunning, 1995, etc). Among various entry mode choices, 
the wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) and the joint venture (JV) are the most important 
and complex investment forms compared to contract-based entry modes (Zhao, et al, 
2004). The choice between WOS and JV has been subject to extensive empirical 
investigations (see a summary by Morschett, et al., 2010). Factors such as transaction 
cost related characteristics, international experience of the MNE, and cultural distance 
between the investing country and the host country have been found to have an impact on 
the choice. We focus here on another important issue:  the impact of corruption distance 
on the choice between WOS and JV.  
 
Corruption, roughly defined as the abuse of public office for private gain, has generated 
an immense literature (Lambert-Mogiliansky, et al, 2007). It is found to inhibit economic 
growth (Mauro, 1995), reduce the legitimacy of government (Anderson and Tverdova, 
2003), and affect political and societal stability (Abed and Gupta, 2002). Although both 
developed and developing countries have various degrees of corruption, the problem of 
corruption is generally more prevalent in developing countries for a variety of political, 
societal and cultural reasons (Monte and Papagni, 2007). In many developing nations, 
business ventures require a large number of official approvals, usually in the form of 
licences or permits, to operate. This provides government officials with the opportunity to 
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reap private benefits at the cost of institutional and social efficiency. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into developing countries is a pertinent case where entry and operations 
are commonly subject to extensive official scrutiny. Although most developing country 
governments see attracting FDI as an important policy priority, inefficient bureaucratic 
procedures and corrupt government officials remain sufficiently widespread to 
discourage international ventures.  
 
Motivated by previous studies, we attempt to explore the effect of corruption distance on 
the ownership choice of MNEs operating in China. Our study departs from the existing 
literature in two principal respects. First, we propose that the direction of corruption 
distance matters. That is, relative to a given host country, MNEs from more corrupt and 
less corrupt countries may react differently to corruption in the host environment. 
Second, we study whether corruption distance between the host and home country of 
MNE increases the preference of WOS over JV. In addition, we investigate whether 
MNEs establishing local market oriented affiliates and those establishing export oriented 
affiliates react to corruption distance differently. Current literature on the relationship 
between corruption and ownership choice has not considered this issue. But recent FDI 
studies have found that local market oriented FDI (also called horizontal FDI) and 
export-oriented FDI (also called vertical FDI) tend to be motivated by very different 
factors (e.g. Markusen and Maskus 2002). Therefore, horizontal FDI and vertical FDI 
may have different responses to the host country institutional attributes such as the 
relative level of corruption in the host environment. Last but not least, we assess whether 
corruption distance and market orientation interact with each other in the process of entry 
mode decision.  
 
China has become one of the top FDI recipient countries in the world; yet surprisingly 
limited research has been conducted to understand whether and how corruption in China 
affects entry strategies of MNEs. The rapid economic development that China has 
achieved so far by no means suggests that corruption is diminishing in this country. 
Instead, some scholars are concerned that corruption in China is becoming systemic 
(Root, 1996; Cheung, 1996). While there might be a host range of issues affected by 
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corruption, we attempt to provide one of the first empirical investigations on the impact 
of corruption distance on the choice of entry mode of MNEs in China. This is a question 
of both empirical and practical significance to researchers, policy makers and MNEs in 
China. FDI regulations in China have long geared towards macroeconomic goal of 
promoting technology transfer and market competition. Therefore, policy makers may 
like to know how the relative corruption level in China affects the ownership structure of 
FDI projects because the structure affects the incentives of the foreign investors to apply 
their resources to the project, the degree of technology transfer, and the distribution of 
gains from FDI. For MNEs, ownership structure has a fundamental effect on how they 
allocate and control resources, coordinate with other parts of the corporation, and the 
prosperity of their operation in the host country.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We review the literature on 
corruption and its impact on the global expansion of MNEs in section 2. This in turn 
motivates the key hypotheses of the paper. We then introduce our empirical strategy in 
section 3. Empirical results are reported in section 4. Finally, we discuss and conclude the 
paper in section 5.   
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2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Literature on corruption and FDI 
 
The effect of corruption on FDI has long been studied. There are different theoretical 
arguments suggesting a positive or negative effect of corruption on FDI. Habib and 
Zurawicki (2002) suggest that while foreign investors may shun corruption because they 
believe it is morally wrong (that is, on ethical grounds), they also may try to avoid 
corruption because it makes local operations risky, difficult to manage, and costly (that is, 
on economic grounds). Aizenman and Spiegel (2006) instead find that multinationals 
avoid corruption because of stringent home country laws. For instance, the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which forbids bribery by American multinationals, put US 
firms at a competitive disadvantage by seeking to prohibit their involvement in corrupt 
practices abroad. There are also posited both ‘grabbing hand’ and ‘helping hand’ effects, 
where it is acknowledged that bribery is costly for firms (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1991; Boycko, Sheifer and Vishny, 1995) but it may also ‘grease the wheels’ of 
commerce, especially in the presence of pre-existing government failures (Kaufmann and 
Wei, 1999). It then becomes an empirical question which effect is dominant.  
 
The empirical evidence on corruption suggests a prevailing negative impact on FDI 
(Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Aizenman and Spiegel, 2006). While such evidence is not 
surprising, Egger and Winner (2006) revealed a more complex relationship between 
corruption and FDI. They found that although corruption is negatively correlated with 
FDI, the effect is neither uniform across countries nor uniform over time. Corruption, in 
their panel data analysis, was found to be important for intra-OECD FDI, but not for 
extra-OECD FDI. They speculated that this is because most FDI in OECD countries is 
horizontal. For non-OECD, developing countries where most FDI is vertical, ‘classical’ 
locational advantages such as low wages and production costs were found to overwhelm 
the impact of corruption. They found in addition that the negative impact of corruption 
has declined over time. In a similar vein, Hakkala, et al (2005) directly differentiated 
horizontal and vertical Swedish FDI in their investigation and found that although 
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corruption reduces the probability that a Swedish firm will invest in a country in general, 
once a decision is made to enter, corruption reduces horizontal FDI but has no significant 
impact on vertical FDI. This demonstrates the different reactions of horizontal and 
vertical FDI to the corruption in the host country and suggests the insufficiency of 
treating FDI as a homogenous phenomenon.  
 
The relationship between corruption and ownership choice has received less attention in 
the literature. One of the earliest attempts is Smarzynska and Wei (2002). In their cross-
sectional analysis of FDI in Eastern Bloc countries, high corruption of the host country 
leads to a preference of JV over WOS (see Table 1 for its methodological details). They 
interpreted that the choice of a lower level of ownership helps to reduce the commitment 
and associated risk in the invested projects and is a sensible reaction the Eastern Bloc 
countries which were quite unstable, risky and in transition environment in 1995. Their 
specific empirical context makes it tentative whether the result can be replicated in other 
countries. In contrast, Asiedu and Esfahani (2000) did not detect any significant impact 
of corruption on the choice between WOS and JV for US MNEs. But their exclusive data 
of overseas affiliates of US MNEs may limit the generalization of their result. In addition, 
none of the studies have differentiated between vertical and horizontal FDI in their 
investigation.  
 
Different from other studies on corruption, Tekin-Koru (2006) probably provided the 
only study that focused on the impact of ‘corruption distance’ on entry mode strategy of 
MNEs. It is found that a higher corruption distance between the host country Turkey and 
home country leads to a preference for WOS relative to JV. The author argued that such 
reaction of MNEs in Turkey is theoretically sensible because Turkey, different from 
Eastern Bloc countries, has hosted foreign investments from Western Europe for a long 
time and had its trade and financial liberalization years before. Its stable environment 
could have reduced the importance of having a local partner. While providing interesting 
insights into the entry mode choice of MNEs in Turkey, one of the evident deficiencies of 
the research is that it did not take the direction of corruption distance into account. By 
using the absolute corruption distance in the investigation, it assumes away the potential 
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relevance of direction of corruption distance. To sum up, the research on how corruption 
affects the entry strategy of MNEs is still in its infancy; more research is needed to 
understand when and how corruption influences entry strategies of MNEs.  
 
The goal of our research is threefold. First we examine possible boundaries to Tekin-
Koru’s (2006) findings concerning corruption distance and mode of entry. We propose 
that the direction of corruption distance matters. A simple example may illuminate its 
important relevance. We take The Corruption Perception Index of 2009 by the 
Transparency International for example as it is a publically assessable data. The index 
shows that, on one hand, China scored 3.6 out of full score 10. The most corrupt country 
according to this index is Somalia which scored only 1.1. Therefore, the corruption 
distance between China and Somalia is 2.5. On the other hand, according to the index, 
Israel scored 6.1, which means that the corruption distance between Israel and China is 
also 2.5, but with important difference from that of Somalia. If we ignore the direction of 
corruption distance, and focus solely on the absolute value, we would assume that Israel 
investors will react to the corruption level in China in a same way as those from Somalia. 
This assumption is precarious and warrants a systematic investigation. Second, we will 
examine whether the corruption distance further influences the choice between WOS and 
JV. Third, we will assess how market orientation influences the choice between WOS 
and JV, and whether it also has a second order effect on entry mode choice by interacting 
with corruption distance. We present our hypotheses development in section 2.2.  
 
2.2. Hypotheses development 
 
The literature has inspired us to infer how the direction of corruption distance influences 
MNEs’ entry strategies from different perspectives. First, firms from different 
institutional environment may develop different range of skills and competence to be able 
to survive and prosper in the environment. From resource dependency perspective 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), for a relatively corrupt host country, foreign investors from 
less corrupt countries may have motivation to seek local partnership in order to obtain the 
necessary ‘skills’ and ‘networks’ to navigate local environment, whereas foreign 
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investors from more corrupt countries may have possessed such skills and therefore are 
‘competent’ enough to operate alone. This argument makes intuitive sense, but it not 
without flaws.  
 
One of the problems of the argument is that it assumes that foreign investors are 
institutional ‘takers’. They readily adjust to the host environment to achieve corporate 
success. But there is evidence in the literature suggesting that MNEs can be powerful 
bargainers, and have long-term influence on the host institutional environment by 
insisting their ‘own’ way of doing business (Chuck and Tadesse, 2006; Ahlquist and 
Prakash, 2009). If this rationale prevails, then we may find that foreign investors from 
transparent countries will resist the host inferior institutional environment by going alone 
in their business to ensure business is conducted in their own and ‘correct’ way. Indeed, 
many MNEs have their global corporate image to protect. The potential cost of their 
involving in ‘inappropriate’ business practice overseas may dampen their corporate 
image beyond the simple measure of short-term profitability. Some research also 
provides empirical evidence suggesting that firm’s managerial attitudes and beliefs, and 
consequently, decisions-making patterns are shaped by their national cultural and 
institutional environment (Erramillli, 1996). MNEs from transparent home countries are 
more frown upon corruption than those from corrupt countries (Wu, 2006). MNE 
managers from less corrupt countries are likely to have values similar to those of their 
home countries. An increasing number of OECD countries also have adopted laws 
similar to the US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA) also means that the home 
jurisdiction can penalize overseas management for inappropriate practices abroad. 
Therefore, there is strong reason to expect that MNEs from a relative clean environment 
may perceive the inferior institutional environment in the host country as a liability and 
prefer operating alone. We hypothesise:  
 
H1: MNEs from less corrupt countries prefer WOSs to JVs.  
H2: The greater the corruption distance that exists between host and home country the 
higher probability the choice for WOS over JV.  
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However, these arguments do not apply for firms from home countries that are equally 
and more corrupt. These firms are not concerned about the potential of partners behaving 
corruptly in a corrupt culture. Consequently, the level of corruption in a host market is 
not part of their mode of entry thought process. Therefore, if a home country of the MNE 
is equally or more corrupt compared to the host country, corruption will not make 
difference in the MNE’s entry mode decision process. Hence, we hypothesize:  
 
H3: MNEs from MNEs from equally and more corrupt home countries will not prefer 
WOS to JV.  
H4: For MNEs from MNEs from equally and more corrupt home countries, corruption 
distance will not impact the choice of WOS versus JV.  
 
Treating FDI as a homogenous lump is probably one of the sources of the inconsistent 
empirical results in the literature. It is becoming clear that local market-seeking and 
export-oriented FDI respond to corruption in the host environment differently (Hakkala, 
et al., 2005). It seems correspondingly likely that the two types of FDI also differ in their 
entry mode strategies. Current literature has suggested that horizontal FDI, compared to 
vertical one, needs more local input, such as knowledge of local markets, consumer 
preferences, business practices, and access to local distribution networks, because the 
primary driver of horizontal FDI is to access local market. As a result, joining forces with 
local firms could be an attractive option because it will help MNEs obtain needed 
information and knowledge speedily compared to develop it in house. In addition, 
horizontal FDI often create direct competition for local firms, therefore, both host 
government and local firms may view collaboration with MNEs an effective way to 
reduce direct competition and increase potential knowledge transfer. As a result, there 
may be more local effort in seeking and initiating partnership with subsidiaries of foreign 
MNEs.  
 
This motive would be lower for vertical FDI because vertical FDI generates less risk of 
damaging local competitors. In addition, high control mode may be favored by MNEs 
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because of the need to closely coordinate their operation with the rest of the value added 
chain located in different locations around the globe. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
H5: Market orientation influences the entry mode choice in a way that higher local 
market orientation induces higher likelihood for MNEs to favor JV in relative to WOS. 
This is true for both MNEs from less corrupt countries and MNEs from equally and more 
corrupt countries.  
 
Apart from the possible tendency that the level of local market orientation may shift MNE’s 
preference towards JV, we are also interested to explore whether market orientation could 
also alter MNEs’ response to corruption distance. This has never been tested in the literature, 
but the influence of heterogeneity of companies’ strategies or other characteristics on their 
response to host country characteristics is not uncommon. For example, tacit know-how is 
found to be a significant and positive predictor explaining MNEs’ preference of WOS in 
relative to JV in knowledge intensive industry, but not in capital-intensive industry (Esther, et 
al., 2007). Firm’s capability can significantly affect their perceived risk associated with 
different entry mode strategies: low capability firms are found to perceive non-equity entry 
mode as the safest strategy, but in contrast more capability firms view it as the most risky 
strategy (Forlani et al., 2008). In the case of corruption distance, we speculate that the desire 
to access local market, obtain necessary local input, such as local information and 
knowledge, distribution channels, and navigate local bureaucratic and commercial 
environment can attenuate the preference of WOS for MNEs from less corrupt countries. 
This seems particularly likely to take place due to the extraordinary potential of the mass 
Chinese market, compared to other smaller economics. Therefore, we suggest the following 
hypothesis to test the possible heterogeneity: 
 
H6: Local-market orientation diminishes the effect of corruption distance on WOS 
preference among MNEs from less corrupt countries. 
 
Having stated our hypotheses, we explain our empirical strategy in section 3.  
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3. Empirical strategy 
 
This research uses FDI data from the city of Suzhou, China. Data from a single city 
admittedly has limitations, but could be advantageous because inter-regional differences 
in China can bring more uncontrollable complexity to the investigation (Pan, 2002). The 
city of Suzhou is located approximately 80 kilometres north of Shanghai, which is the 
commercial centre of Mainland China. Suzhou is the most important city in Changjiang 
Delta and is one of the top FDI recipient cities in China with its unique geographic 
location, well educated work force, and substantially established indigenous industries. 
Our data set is drawn from the government survey on foreign direct investment activities 
in 2005 (the survey was conducted in 2006). It contains all entry permits granted to 
foreign investors in the city between 1981 and 2005. There are 9564 entries by foreign 
MNEs from 72 countries and regions throughout the world.  
 
In order to test how the entry strategy of FDI responds to corruption, we use a 
dichotomous dependent variable to indicate the choice between WOS and JV, in which 
WOS is indicated by the value of 1, and JV 0. For the key dependent variable corruption 
distance, we choose the corruption index from International Country Risk Group (ICRG) 
for its widespread country and period coverage. The index is composed in a way that high 
values indicate low corruption level in the country
1
. The scores range from 1 to 6. We 
measure corruption distance in two ways. First, we generate a dummy variable to indicate 
the direction of corruption distance, namely, whether the home country of the MNE is 
less corrupt than China or otherwise. Countries which are less corrupt than China are 
indicated by value 1, 0 otherwise. This dummy variable can reveal between the two 
groups of countries whether MNEs from them respond to corruption in China differently. 
While majority countries in our sample record persistent positive corruption distance 
from China, namely, they are less corrupt than Chin across years, some countries, such as 
Brunei, Indonesia, Panama, Paraguay, and Thailand show to be persistently more corrupt 
than China. Second, we use two continuous variables to indicate corruption distance for 
                                                 
1 We also collected corruption data from World Governance Indicators (WGI) and Transparency International (TI) and 
found, for available year and country entries, a high correlation with the ICRG data (see Table 2). This is consistent 
with the findings of other authors (e.g. Hakkala, et al., 2005) that these measures are highly correlated and supports our 
use of the single ICRG index owing to its superior coverage. 
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the two groups of countries respectively. Corruption distance 1 is the absolute differential 
value between the corruption scores of the home country and China for less corrupt 
countries. Corruption distance 2 is the absolute differential value between the corruption 
scores of the home country and China for countries which are equally or more corrupt 
than China. This will enable us to test whether MNEs from the two groups of countries 
react to corruption distance differently.  
 
To test our fifth hypothesis, market orientation is measured in two ways to best utilize the 
data. First, we measure it as a dichotomous variable where horizontal FDI (if the ratio of 
local sales to total sales is 1) is indicated by the value 1, and vertical FDI (if the ratio of 
local sales to total sales is 0) is indicated by 0. This variable is called market orientation 
dummy in our tables to be discussed shortly. This measurement matches the theoretical 
description of horizontal and vertical FDI perfectly, but it generates unnecessary missing 
values because, in reality, some subsidiaries have both local sales and export. Therefore, 
we produce a second measurement, where the level of market orientation is measured by 
the ratio of local sales to total sales, so that it becomes a continuous, rather than a 
discrete, variable. This way the sample becomes more inclusive.  In our empirical testing, 
these two variables are used alternatively to assess the effect of market orientation on the 
entry mode choice. Subsequently, we also create an interaction terms of market 
orientation and corruption distance 1 to assess whether market orientation attenuates the 
effect of corruption distance on entry mode choice for MNEs from less corrupt countries.   
 
We also include a host of control variables to supplement the model. The country level 
control variables are as follows. The first is political risk. As scholars argued that one of 
the specific reasons for JVs are favoured in Eastern Bloc countries in 1995 is probably 
because they were unstable, risky and in transition (Tekin-Koru, 2006; Smarzynska and 
Wei, 2002). It implies that political risk that may induce upright expropriation in the host 
country needs to be managed in a different manner from petty corruption which merely 
involves paying extra cost to grease business. While some scholars are able to study 
‘pervasive’ corruption and ‘arbitrary’ corruption respectively to distinguish the different 
dimensions of corruption (Uhlenbruck et al, 2006), unfortunately, there is no sufficient 
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data on China to enable a meaningful assessment
2
. As an alternative, we control political 
risk, similar as Lee and Oh (2007). The data is drawn from PRS group. It is a composite 
index with value ranging between 1 and 9. Higher scores indicate more stable political 
system. In a similar vein, we include rule of law (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001) and 
economic freedom in our model to delineate whether they, instead of corruption, have an 
effect on the entry mode choice. Data of rule of law is from World Governance Indicators 
by World Bank Institute. It captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. The scores range between -2 and 2, with higher values indicating better law 
system. Date of economic freedom is from Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal. 
It measures to what extent the freedom of work, produce, consume, and invest is 
protected and unconstrained by the state. Higher scores indicate freer marketplace and 
less government intervention.  
 
In addition, we also control cultural distance, but with important difference in our 
application from what is seen in most recent literature. Most previous studies have 
adopted Kogut and Singh’s composite index (1988) to specify cultural distance, but the 
empirical results regarding entry mode choice are decidedly mixed (Tihanyi et al, 2005). 
The use of the composite index is criticized to lack theoretical relevance to specific cross-
border outcomes and therefore should be avoided to generate more conflicting results 
(Shenkar, 2001; McSweeney, 2002; Kirkman, et al, 2006). What is advocated is distance 
measures based on single cultural dimensions which show explicit theoretical relevance 
to the investigated outcome. As a result, we refer to Siegel, et al. (2006) who developed 
and empirically demonstrated that cultural distance regarding egalitarianism has an 
impact on FDI. To be specific, the egalitarianism/hierarchy dimension deals with the 
preferred way to elicit cooperative, productive activity in society and in particular with 
the issue of power. Two countries with large egalitarianism distances may suffer from 
                                                 
2 We attempted to capture the different impact of pervasive and arbitrary corruption, but the data source used by 
Uhlenbruck et al, 2006, namely World Business Environment Survey, does not contain sufficient data on China.  
 13 
 
lower FDI flows because of irreconcilable perceptions of power, equality and tolerance of 
different business practices (Siegel, et al., 2006).  
 
Furthermore, geographic distance is controlled as an economic factor (Leamer and 
Levinsohn, 1995; Caves, 1996; di Mauro, 2000). Transaction cost economics suggests 
that headquarter and subsidiaries can be understood as a type of principal-agent relation 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; O’Donnell, 1997). A key difference between WOS and JV is 
that joint ventures have multiple principles, which makes the goal incongruence problem 
potentially more severe in JVs than in WOSs. Compared to a JV, a WOS has superior 
ability to install various monitoring instruments, such as replicating the organizational 
rules and procedures into the subsidiaries, demanding free and transparent information 
flows from and to the subsidiaries, and assigning expatriates. However, Grossman and 
Helpman (2004) suggested that, ceteris paribus, it becomes increasingly difficult over 
longer geographic distances to have timely communication and accurate information 
flows between headquarter and subsidiaries; therefore the monitoring efficiency 
deteriorates with longer geographic distance.  As a result, MNEs may be less averse to 
setting up joint ventures when the advantages of full ownership arrangements are 
weakened by geographic distance.  
 
We also consider industry specific factors. Based on the empirical evidence of Gomes-
Casseres (1990), Makino and Neupert (2000), Chen and Hennart (2002) among others, 
we use an industry dummy to identify resource-intensive industries. The common view is 
that resource-based industries tend to have high local equity participation because access 
to natural resources is often controlled by local incumbents. In our investigation the 
following is coded as resource-intensity industry: agriculture, forestry, farming, 
agricultural processing, food, beverages, textiles, wood, paper, tyre, non-metal mineral 
manufacturing, black metal processing and metal processing, indigenous craft products 
and recycling. Policy related factor is also taken into account. FDI into China was subject 
to tight control (Teng, 2004) during the 1980s and early 1990s. In approving projected 
FDI, the Chinese government tended to favour joint ventures, especially in restricted 
industries such as auto manufacturing. However, the situation has been quietly changing. 
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With the implementation of the Provisional Guidelines on Foreign Investment Projects 
issued in 1995, the Chinese government has loosened its restrictions on full ownership 
arrangements. Therefore, we predict that MNEs are more likely to establish a WOS than 
a JV after the implementation of the Provisional Guidelines on Foreign Investment 
Projects in 1995. Our data set makes it possible to control for the following subsidiary 
characteristics. Project size is measured by the natural log of total assets of the subsidiary. 
The natural log of the total foreign capital invested in the project can reflect the 
involvement and commitment of the foreign MNEs in the subsidiary. Capital intensity, 
measured as total assets per employee, can indicate the asset tangibility of the operation. 
Labour productivity, measured as net profit per employee, may show the efficiency of the 
operation. Table 3 summarizes the variables, their measurement, and data sources. Table 
4 presents the descriptive statistics, and Table 5 reports the correlation matrix of the main 
variables.  
 
 
4. Results  
 
We report our results in a step-wise manner to build up our discussion. Firstly, Table 6 
reports a preliminary analysis of our first five hypotheses in a simplistic manner to 
establish the basic findings. We then focus on the sub-sample where the results for less 
corrupt countries (than China) are presented in Table 6. This is to focus our discussion on 
to what extent our sixth hypothesis obtains supporting evidence in our investigation.   
 
In Table 6, we employ random effects logistic regressions to control for the possible 
correlation between subsidiaries from a common home country. This enables the models 
to accommodate this country level cluster effect. To minimize the loss of observations, 
we did not include economic freedom as a country level control variable because its 
inclusion causes collinearity with other country level variables, and also reduces the 
sample size drastically. Model 1 serves as the baseline, where we have 5985 observations 
across 52 countries with complete information. The Wald chi square of the model is 
1018.292 and the log likelihood of the model is -2399.497. In this model, corruption 
distance dummy shows to have a marginally significant and positive impact on entry 
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mode choice, which suggests that MNEs from less corrupt countries prefer to have WOS 
in relative to JV compared to their peers from equally or more corrupt countries than 
China. All country level control variables do not show statistical significance; in contrast, 
all project level control variables have achieved statistical significance with expected 
signs, except labor productivity which shows to have no correlation with entry mode 
choice. In specific, resource intensity industry, the size of the project, and capital 
intensity of the project increase the likelihood of JV being chosen over WOS, whereas 
projects with large foreign capital injection are more likely to be WOS. Variable 
year_1995 was dropped out of the model because of collinearity. This is primarily 
because the available data of country level variables mostly are from years after 1995. 
When we did not include any country level variables, year_1995 has always achieved 
statistically significant and positive result, suggesting an overall important influence on 
MNEs’ preference of WOS after the government loosened up the ownership restriction in 
1995. We do not report these results for the sake of brevity. To sum up, Model 1 seems to 
establish the evidence that overall MNEs from less corrupt countries prefer WOS 
compared to their peers from equally or more corrupt home countries than China. This 
lends support to our first hypothesis. This also supports our argument in the third 
hypothesis that MNEs from MNEs from equally and more corrupt home countries do not 
prefer WOS to JV. The main effect of corruption distance dummy is also visualized in 
Graph 1. Although we achieve a statistically significant result, the coefficient of this 
dummy is rather weak, standing at 0.042, which explains the very gradual slope shown in 
Graph 1.  
 
Model 2 continue to assess whether higher corruption distance induces MNEs from less 
corrupt countries to favor WOS to JV. It is noted that Corruption distance 1 is a 
continuous variable. It achieves a statistically significant and positive result, suggesting 
that the more transparent the home country of the MNE is, the more likely it is to choose 
WOS over JV. This effect is also visualized in Graph 2, where we can see that the slope 
shows to be less flat than in Graph 1, which reflects on the higher coefficient (0.115) that 
corruption distance 1 obtains in this specification.  
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In direct contrast, corruption distance 2 in Model 3 obtained a statistically insignificant 
result, which indicates that corruption distance between China and those equally or even 
more corrupt countries does not have significant influence on the entry mode decisions of 
their MNEs. We also visualize this effect in Graph 3 despite the insignificant result. We 
can see that the slope is slightly steeper (coefficient 0.261) than that in Graph 2 
(coefficient 0.115), but it is statistically insignificant. The results confirm our speculation 
that, for less corrupt home countries, the larger the corruption distance between them and 
China, the more likely their MNEs would favor WOS in relative to JV; but corruption 
distance is not an important predictor of entry mode choice for MNEs from those equally 
or more corrupt countries than China. It is noted that in Model 3, country level variables 
were dropped because they cause collinearity. This is due to the combination of smaller 
sample size and the fact that most country level variables are highly correlated with each 
other within this stripped sample. All the project level control variables in Model 3 attain 
similar results as that in Model 1 and Model 2.  
 
Model 4 and Model 5 provide a preliminary glimpse on the effect of market orientation, 
which is measured as a dummy variable in the former, and a continuous one in the latter. 
Both models provide strong support for the argument that the level of local market 
orientation (horizontal FDI), compared to export orientation (vertical FDI), is a 
significant predictor of entry mode choice. Local market orientation significantly reduces 
the probability that WOS will be chosen over JV, suggesting a powerful effect that the 
need to access market and its knowledge can curve the tendency of choosing high control 
mode for its operation. More interestingly, in Model 4, rule of law obtains a negative and 
marginally significant result, suggesting the better rule of law system the home country of 
the MNE has, the more likely it is to choose JV over WOS. This might reflect a tendency 
for MNEs from countries with better rule of law system to seek local partnership to deal 
with potential disputes and conflicts due to substandard quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights protection, and the function of court in China. This result stands in Model 
5 as well. Apart from this interesting new finding in Model 4 and Model 5, the rest results 
are qualitatively similar to those of Model 1 and Model 2.  
 
 17 
 
Table 7 reports the result for MNEs from less corrupt countries with a focus on the 
interaction term of corruption distance 1 and market orientation. In Model 1, corruption 
distance 1 attains a positive and significant result, consistent with those in Table 6. This 
suggests that larger corruption distance between home countries of MNEs and China 
induces MNEs to favor WOS over JV as their entry mode choice. Market orientation 
dummy receives a negative and significant result, again, consistent with what we found in 
Table 6. This establishes the evidence that horizontal FDI, compared to vertical FDI, 
prefers JV as their entry mode choice. The rest of control variables, including both 
country level and project level ones, receive similar results as those in Table 6. It is noted 
that the sample size becomes much smaller because of only small number of countries 
have complete data for the three country level factors: political risk, rule of law and 
economic freedom. Overall, the model has a good explanatory power judging by the 
Wald chi square and log likelihood. It is also noted that rule of law receives a significant 
and negative result in Model 1, consistent with what we found in Table 6.  
 
In Model 2, we include the interaction term of corruption distance 1 and market 
orientation dummy. We found that the interaction term carries a negative but insignificant 
sign. But corruption distance 1 is still a significant predictor in this model. Therefore, we 
interpret that when corruption distance is considered together with market orientation, its 
significant influence on the preference of a WOS over JV declines. To put it another way, 
local market orientation reduces the tendencies for MNEs from less corrupt countries to 
favor WOS. This suggests support for our sixth hypothesis. To re-assess this result, we 
use market orientation, a continuous variable, as an alternative variable to replace its 
dummy in Model 3 and Model 4, which are more inclusive than Model 1 and Model 2. 
The results obtained are qualitatively identical. The effect of this key interaction term is 
visualized in Graph 4, where we see the x-axis represents this interaction term measured 
by Corruption distance 1 multiply market orientation dummy. It is noted although the 
slope is steep, statistically it is not significant. But what is clear from our analysis, 
especially from the contrast between graph 2 and Graph 4, is that local market orientation 
substantially attenuates the tendency for MNEs to prefer WOS.  
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We now sum up our results. First of all, we found substantial evidence suggesting the 
direction of corruption distance matters. MNEs from less corrupt countries, compared to 
their peers from equally or more corrupt countries, prefer WOS over JV as their entry 
strategy. The larger the corruption distance between their home countries and China, the 
more likely they favor WOS over JV. Local market oriented operations are more likely to 
be JVs regardless whether the MNE is from more or less corrupt country. For those from 
less corrupt countries, their tendency to prefer WOS is attenuated with the increased level 
of local market orientation.  
 
There are some limits we like to reflect that may caution us with our results. First, it is 
apparent that the samples used contain much smaller number of observations than the full 
sample promised to. Two factors have contributed to this. One is that country level data 
are not available for some places, such as Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Island, 
Samoa, St Kitts-Nevis, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, some East European countries, and more 
importantly Taiwan
3
. In total, they account for approximately 35% of the total sample. 
Second, institutional variables, such as political risk, rule of law and economic freedom 
are mostly available after year 1995, which caused more data loss in the investigation. 
For the two groups of countries, one is less corrupt and the other no less corrupt than 
China, the latter usually has a very small sample sizes due to the fact that only a selected 
number of countries are more corrupt than China. If future studies can contain a more 
balanced data to explore the issue of corruption distance, it may enable a more robust 
assessment regarding how MNEs from more corrupt countries behave. We also develop a 
negative hypothesis (hypothesis 3), which can be controversial. But since our main result 
regarding hypothesis 1 is strongly supported, the essence of our argument regarding 
hypothesis is therefore corroborated. Another limit of the research is that we do not have 
MNE parent data, which has limited our statistical test to only subsidiary and country 
level factors. Thirdly, our results regarding the attenuating impact of local market 
orientation on MNEs’ response to corruption distance could be China specific. It is 
important if future studies could replicate this test in other countries’ context.  
                                                 
3
 Regional level data of Taiwan are seriously incomplete because many macro databases simply do not include Taiwan 
as an independent economy. However, Taiwan has contributed to over 17% of total FDI received by Suzhou.  
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6. Discussions and Conclusions 
 
Corruption has been a common concern for international investors. For MNEs which bear 
considerable commitment to their overseas expansion, how to react to corruption in the 
host environment is of interest to both practitioners and policy markers. Our study 
provides new evidence which lends some support to Tekin-Koru (2006), where 
corruption distance is also found to lead to a preference of WOS for MNEs operating in 
Turkey. This is perhaps because China, similar to Turkey, has a relative stable political 
environment and has hosted FDI for a few decades with remarkably successful 
experience despite its high corruption level. However, caution has to be taken since 
Tekin-Koru (2006) did not take the direction of corruption distance into account. Our 
investigation also controls for project level variables that have shown to have significant 
power in predicting the entry mode choice of MNEs, which were not considered in 
Tekin-Koru (2006). Another interesting finding in our analysis is that the home country’s 
rule of law system influences its MNEs decision making regarding entry mode choice. 
MNEs from countries with stronger rule of law favor collaborating with local firms 
perhaps to avoid potential difficulties that may arise due to substandard quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights protection, and the function of court in China. 
 
As the Chinese government has been constantly encouraging the formation of joint 
ventures between foreign firms and indigenous Chinese firms in the hope that it will 
accelerate potential knowledge spillovers from FDI, our study suggests that reducing the 
prevailing corruption will help the government to attain its purpose. Although the huge 
consumer base has helped China in inducing MNEs to establish joint ventures so far, an 
improvement in the country-wide institutional environment would no doubt provide more 
confidence for MNEs considering whether to set up more joint ventures in China. From 
MNEs’ perspective, especially those from transparent countries, a wholly owned 
subsidiary gives them higher control over the way their business and operations are 
organized and conducted. The extra cost that may occur to deal with corrupt environment 
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could be justified considering the significant implications of protecting and sustaining 
their corporate governance and global image. Conflict with local partners regarding how 
to deal with corrupt officials could be equally or more taxing than resisting them in their 
own way. The bargaining power of MNEs, especially those large ones from developed 
nations, makes it all the more likely that they will encounter less corruption in the process 
of entry because they are usually the targets of many local governments compete to 
attract and appeal to. Therefore, our investigation suggests that corruption in China does 
not justify partnering with local firms. MNEs can go along in their operation to deal with 
the problem. Future research can seek to establish whether there is a causal relation 
between the choice of entry mode and the performance of MNEs in China. A formal 
assessment of that type would provide MNEs with a more precise guide on how to design 
their entry strategies. In addition, future studies can examine whether there is a learning 
effect with respect to MNE’s entry strategies. Do MNEs respond to corruption differently 
in their repeated investment in China? Do they learn from their peers in the same 
industry, or from same home country, regarding which entry mode to choose to best deal 
with corruption? A systematic examination of these questions will undoubtedly provide a 
more dynamic understanding of how corruption in China influences MNEs’ strategies.   
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Table 1: Methodological comparison of studies on the impact of corruption on ownership choice 
Author Sample data Research focus Measure
ment of Y 
Measurement 
of corruption 
Other variables Methodology Results 
Smarzynska 
and Wei 
(2002) 
720 projects originating 
from 25 countries in 22 
CEE countries 
1) Invest or not 
invest 
2) WOS or JV 
1) 1/0 
(dummy) 
 
2). 1/0 
(dummy) 
WDR, 
Neumann, & 
KKZ 
Country: GDP, GDP per 
capita, corporate tax, 
distance 
Single-equation probit regression  
with between 2808 to 3570 
observations  
High corruption leads to 
preference of JV 
Parent: size, diversity, 
technology intensity or 
advertising intensity 
Tekin-Kory 
(2006) 
Foreign invested firms 
from 88 country or origin 
in Turkey 
Counts of WOS 
and JV  
Discrete 
number 
of WOS 
and JV 
Transparency 
international: 
Corruption 
index 
Country: GDP, skill 
difference, distance, border, 
experience 
Two equations using random 
negative binomial model to 
estimate the number of WOS and 
JV, with 968 observations 
High corruption distance leads 
to preference of WOS 
Uhlenbruck 
et al (2006) 
220 telecommunication 
projects in 64 emerging 
countries 
Preference 
among WOS, JV 
and non-equity 
mode 
Category 
variable 
Transparency 
international: 
Corruption 
index, World 
Business 
Environment 
Survey 
Country: GDP, GDP per 
capita, Regulatory policy, 
political risk, FDI restrictions, 
WTO commitments 
Multinomial logistic regression 
with  220 observations 
Pervasive corruption leads to 
preference of WOS;   
Arbitrary leads to preference of 
JV. 
Subsidiary: size, technology 
intensity, state participation 
 
Asiedu and 
Esfahani 
(2001) 
21300 non-bank affiliates 
of U.S. MNEs in 42 
countries 
1). WOS or JV 
2). Equity share 
(continuous) 
1) 1/0 
(dummy) 
2)  
percent of 
equity 
 
ICRG: Rule of 
law  
& corruption 
index  
Country: infrastructure 
availability, local knowledge, 
education, social-cultural 
distance, openness, domestic 
technology capability, FDI 
policy 
1. Single-equation probit 
regression 
with between 1523 to 2416 
observations 
 
2. Truncated model on foreign 
equity share of joint  ventures with 
331 observation 
Better rule of law leads to 
preference of JV; 
The impact of corruption on the 
choice between WOS and JV is 
insignificant.   
Industry: technology 
intensity, resource intensity, 
vertical integration, 
marketing seeking 
Parent: Non-contractible 
assets, parent size, diversity, 
international experience 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix between ICRG, TI, and WGI corruption data in our sample 
  ICRG TI WGI 
ICRG 1.000   
TI 0.959**
 
1.000  
WGI 0.955** 0.989** 1.000 
* (**) indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05(0.01) level (two-tailed, Pearson). 
ICRG is International Country Risk Group  
TI is Transparency International 
WGI is World Governance Indicators from World Bank  
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Table 3: Variables and measurement 
Variable Measurement Data source 
Dependent variable   
Entry mode choice WOS=1; JV=0 This study 
Independent variables   
Corruption distance (dummy) Less corrupt countries =1;  otherwise= 0 PRS group and this study 
Corruption distance 1 Absolute value of the corruption score differential between the home country and China 
for home countries which are less corrupt than China 
PRS group and this study 
Corruption distance 2 Absolute value of the corruption score differential between the home country and China 
for home countries which are equally or more corrupt than China 
PRS group and this study 
Market orientation (dummy) Horizontal FDI=1; Vertical FDI=0 This study 
Market orientation Local sales/Total sales This study 
Corruption distance 1* Market orientation (dummy) See above This study 
Corruption distance 1* Market orientation See above This study 
Corruption distance 2* Market orientation (dummy) See above This study 
Corruption distance 2* Market orientation See above This study 
Control variables   
Political risk A composite index of 5 elements. Score 1-9. Higher values indicate more stable system. PRS group 
Rule of law Score -2 to 2. Higher values indicate better law system World Bank Institute. 
Economic feedom A composite index of 10 components Heritage Foundation & WS 
Egalitarian distance Egalitarian score of the foreign country - egalitarian score of China Siegel et al 2006 
Geographic distance Natural log of physical distance in miles between Suzhou and the capital city of investing 
country 
This study  
Resource industry Resource intensity industry=1; otherwise=0 Chen and Hennart 1992 
Year_1995 After 1995=1; otherwise=0 This study 
Size The natural log of total fixed assets (10,000RMB) reported by the registered project This study  
Total foreign capital investment The natural log of foreign investment (10,000RMB) received by the registered project This study 
Capital intensity The ratio of total fixed assets divided by the number of employee This study 
Labor productivity Net profit divided by the number of employee This study 
3/33 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Entry mode choice  0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Corruption distance (dummy) 0.88 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Corruption distance 1 1.92 0.84 0.50 5.00 
Corruption distance 2 0.16 0.40 0.00 3.00 
Market orientation dummy 0.82 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Market orientation 0.60 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Political risk 7.73 0.46 4.38 9.06 
Rule of law 1.18 0.38 -1.81 1.99 
Economic freedom 78.14 9.78 44.34 90.00 
Egalitarian distance 0.29 0.21 -0.06 1.07 
Geographic distance 7.52 1.10 6.21 9.39 
Resource industry 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Year_1995 0.90 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Size 16.33 2.24 0.00 22.92 
Total foreign capital investment 4.70 1.71 0.51 10.91 
Capital intensity 0.02 0.10 0.01 10.00 
Labor productivity 0.05 3.98 0.02 341.66 
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Table 5: Correlation matrix of main variables 
Entry mode choice 1                       
Corruption distance (dummy) .786 1                     
Market orientation -0.2111 0.365 1                   
Political risk 0.1084 0.448 -0.2272 1                 
Rule of law -0.0334 0.492 -0.0438 0.4446 1               
Economic freedom -0.1591 0.312 0.2483 -0.5355 0.2519 1             
Egalitarian distance -0.012 0.210 -0.0094 -0.0545 0.5536 0.142 1           
Geographic distance 
0.0711 0.103 -0.1605 0.2259 0.3829 -0.3948 0.7072 1         
Resource industry 
-0.1089 0.039 0.1807 -0.0818 -0.0132 0.107 -0.0209 -0.0558 1       
Size 
-0.1145 -0.029 -0.0517 -0.0733 -0.091 0.0809 -0.0654 -0.0854 -0.0098 1     
Total foreign capital investment 
0.2423 0.081 -0.0934 -0.0035 0.0044 0.0628 -0.0042 -0.0487 -0.0639 0.5894 1   
Capital intensity 
0.0117 0.034 0.046 -0.0204 0.0458 0.0447 0.0515 0.0186 -0.0614 -0.4587 -0.023 1 
Labor productivity 
-0.0456 0.067 -0.0743 0.0479 -0.0156 -0.0703 -0.0319 0.015 0.0074 0.1516 0.0033 -0.3652 
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Table 6: Random-effects logistic regression  
Dependent variable 1=WOS; 0=JV 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Hypothesis 1&3 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 5 Hypothesis 5 
Independent variables      
Corruption distance (dummy) 0.042*     
Corruption distance 1  0.115**    
Corruption distance 2   0.261   
Market orientation (dummy)    -1.030***  
Market orientation     -0.950*** 
      
Control variables      
Political risk 0.050 0.050  1.088 0.640 
Rule of law -0.430 -0.430  -2.972* -1.548* 
Egalitarian distance 0.319 0.319  0.567 -1.015 
Geographic distance 0.092 0.142  0.165 0.507 
Resource industry -0.521*** -0.532*** -0.496*** -0.341*** -0.523*** 
Size -0.862*** -0.910*** -0.643*** -0.798*** -0.955*** 
Total foreign capital investment 1.230*** 1.264*** 1.132*** 1.041*** 1.282*** 
Capital intensity -35.435*** -36.152*** -34.261*** -31.310*** -45.809*** 
Labor productivity -0.049 -0.061 0.148 -0.070 -0.061 
_cons 9.483*** 10.142*** 6.101*** 9.946*** 11.581*** 
      
Model Summary      
No. Observations 5985 5222 763 4262 7314 
Number of Countries 52 45 30 67 74 
Wald Chi2 1018.29 890.08 118.91 662.81 1170.29 
Prob>chi2 *** *** *** *** *** 
Log likelihood -2399.497 -2062.858 -331.395 -1710.218 -2526.697 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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Table 7: Random-effects logistic regression (Dependent variable 1=WOS; 0=JV): Less corrupt countries 
Dependent variable 1=WOS; 0=JV 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Hypothesis 6  Hypothesis 6 
Independent variables     
Corruption distance 1 0.143* 0.103* 0.127* 0.114* 
Market orientation dummy -1.030*** -0.159   
Corruption distance 1* Market orientation dummy  -0.591   
Market orientation   -0.942*** -0.172 
Corruption distance 1*Market orientation     -0.383 
     
Control variables     
Political risk 1.031 0.891 0.330 0.250 
Rule of law -2.905* -2.631* -1.222* -1.063* 
Economic freedom 0.015 0.009 0.008 0.004 
Egalitarian distance 1.108 0.955 -1.213 -1.246 
Geographic distance 0.151 0.120* 0.423* 0.399* 
Resource industry -0.340*** -0.336*** -0.479*** -0.477** 
Size -0.882*** -0.880*** -1.107*** -1.107*** 
Total foreign capital investment 0.991*** 0.987*** 1.356*** 1.356*** 
Capital intensity -33.811*** -32.134*** -32.043*** -32.069*** 
Labor productivity -0.211 0.200 0.220 -0.213 
_cons 4.935 5.351 9.413 9.732 
     
Model Summary     
No. Observations 766 766 1211 1211 
Number of Countries 9 9 9 9 
Wald Chi2 151.33 151.48 253.92 253.81 
Prob>chi2 *** *** *** *** 
Log likelihood -376.544 -366.599 -498.850 -498.463 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
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